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REASONABILITY OF A CREDITOR’S CLAIM FOR 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
ABSTRACT 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges are generally given the 
power to limit claims for attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable” amount. If an 
attorney for the debtor or an attorney for a creditor’s committee tries to collect 
unreasonable fees from the debtor’s estate, the judge can disallow them, 
preserving the valuable and finite resources of the estate. Yet, the Code does not 
extend the judge’s power to limit claims for attorneys’ fees made by creditors. 
Generally speaking, creditors are not able to collect their attorneys’ fees from 
the debtor’s estate. However, in Pacific Gas and Electric’s (PG&E) 2019 
bankruptcy case, an unusual combination of facts required the debtor to pay the 
attorneys’ fees of many of their creditors. If a creditor submitted a claim for 
unreasonable attorneys’ fees, judges would not have the power to disallow these 
fees. These attorneys could therefore collect exorbitant fees at the expense of 
other creditors, and judges would have no mechanism to control this behavior.  
This Comment advocates for an amendment to the Code that gives judges 
the power to restrict all unreasonable claims for attorneys’ fees. This 
amendment would solve two issues. First, the amendment would clarify that a 
creditor can submit claims for their attorneys’ fees when a state statute requires 
the debtor to pay these fees. While most jurisdictions allow a creditor’s claim to 
include their attorneys’ fees, a minority of bankruptcy courts do not allow these 
claims. The minority position is inconsistent with the Code. Therefore, this 
amendment to the Code would clarify that the Code does not disallow a 
creditor’s claims for attorneys’ fees. Second, the amendment would give judges 
the new power to control unreasonable claims for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees. 
This power would ensure that all claims including attorneys’ fees are treated 
the same and that creditors’ attorneys, in rare cases like the PG&E case, could 
not take advantage of this hole in the Code. Judges need a mechanism to control 
all claims that include attorneys’ fees, no matter how infrequent the situation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Introduction to Attorneys’ Fees 
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity. Bankruptcy courts are guided by 
equitable principles, tasked with exercising discretion to safeguard the public 
interest, so long as their acts are consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.1 Debtors who find themselves in bankruptcy rarely have the resources to 
repay all of their creditors. The Code provides mechanisms to repay these 
creditors fairly. While some of the debtor’s resources are owed to creditors who 
existed before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the debtor must use some of these 
funds to repay actors who did work on behalf of the debtor during the bankruptcy 
process. These actors include attorneys who are owed fees for the services they 
provide in the bankruptcy case. These attorneys will be paid from the same pile 
of money as all other creditors to whom the debtor owes money. Therefore, 
every dollar the court pays an attorney is another dollar taken away from the 
creditors who are simply trying to recover what they were already owed by the 
debtor. On the other hand, without strong representation by an attorney, creditors 
will be unable to recover any amount from the debtor. As a result, the subject of 
these attorneys’ fees awards “is perhaps the most delicate issue which a 
bankruptcy court must consider.”2 
Bankruptcy courts generally have discretion in determining the amount of 
attorneys’ fees awarded, so long as the courts are acting within the confines of 
the Code.3 When bankruptcy attorneys representing the debtor apply for 
payment from the debtor’s limited funds, the Code specifies that their payment 
must always be reasonable.4 The Code also requires reasonability of fees being 
paid to the attorneys who represent committees in bankruptcy.5 But, a similar 
blanket provision for attorneys of creditors is missing from the Code. Instead, 
the Code is silent for creditors’ attorneys and does not provide bankruptcy judges 
with any mechanisms to limit unreasonable claims by creditors’ attorneys. 
Because “every dollar expended on legal fees results in a dollar less that is 
available for distribution to the creditors,” bankruptcy courts should work to 
 
 1 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940). 
 2 In re Atwell, 148 B.R. 483, 487 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1993); see generally In re Bush, 131 B.R. 364, 365 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) (court has duty to review fees even when no objection raised by any party). 
 3 In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1298 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 4 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (2019). 
 5 Id. 
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prevent inequitable recovery of funds from all attorneys, including the attorneys 
of creditors.6  
B. Fee-Shifting Creditor’s Attorneys’ Fees 
A Code provision about a creditor’s attorneys’ fees would be inapplicable in 
most bankruptcy cases. Generally speaking, the attorneys’ fees of creditors will 
not be paid by the debtor. The fees will instead be paid by that creditor outside 
of the bankruptcy forum. Under the American Rule, there is generally no fee-
shifting, meaning that both parties bear the burden of paying their own attorneys’ 
fees.7 But, there are some ways to overcome the American Rule. If the American 
Rule is overcome in a bankruptcy case, the debtor will be required to pay that 
creditor’s attorneys’ fees.8   
If a creditor is able to overcome the American Rule, she is able to include 
the contingency fees of her attorneys as a line-item on her proof of claim in 
bankruptcy. This line-item exists on the creditor’s prayer for relief at the end of 
her proof of claim.9 When listing the total amount of her claim, the creditor must 
indicate that the amount of the claim “includes interest or other charges,” and 
then “attach [a] statement itemizing interest, fees, expenses, or other charges 
required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c)(2)(A).”10 This itemized statement includes 
all damages the creditor is requesting as a part of her claim.  
Creditors in bankruptcy are not always individuals in a business relationship 
with the debtor. In some cases, these creditors are involved in personal injury or 
mass tort litigation with the debtor. These tort victim creditors often set up 
contingency fee arrangements with their attorneys.11 In these arrangements, the 
attorney is only paid if the tort victim’s case wins at trial. The attorney is then 
paid a percentage amount of the tort victim’s award, an amount which is often 
substantially higher than the recovery in cases without contingency fee 
arrangements.12 In cases where these large fees were imposed on the debtor-
 
 6 In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293, 299 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 7 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007); see, e.g., In re Lane Poultry of 
Carolina, Inc., 63 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986). 
 8 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016 (fee-shifting attorneys’ fees clauses are generally viewed as a means of 
indemnifying a creditor for costs actually incurred in collecting debts, as opposed to being viewed a penalty for 
the debtor). 
 9 See, e.g., Proof of Claim at 66, Thomas Adams v. PG&E, No. CGC-19-573195 (Cal. S. Ct. filed Apr. 
13, 2019) [hereinafter Adams Proof of Claim] (“Attorneys’ fees as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 1021.5”).  
 10 E.g., id. at 2.  
 11 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 560–61 (1992). 
 12 In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d 592, 597–98 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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business, the costs have driven the businesses to file for bankruptcy13 and have 
reduced the available compensation for other creditors (including the victims 
themselves).14  
C. Case Study: The 2019 PG&E Bankruptcy  
One of these mass tort bankruptcy cases, Pacific Gas and Electronic 
Company (“PG&E”), was filed in 2019.15 PG&E was charged with causing a 
series of California wildfires in 2017. These wildfires resulted in both the loss 
of life and property for many California citizens at an estimated $30 billion in 
liability.16 The potential liability for PG&E arises primarily because of a unique 
California statutory doctrine known as “inverse condemnation.”17 This doctrine 
has its roots in the United States Constitution’s takings clause.18 The takings 
clause requires government units to award compensation when they take or 
damage private property.19 Because courts have extended this power of eminent 
domain to private utilities companies like PG&E, these companies also must 
assume the risk of liability for any damages caused by the taking of private 
property.20 The doctrine of inverse condemnation creates strict liability for these 
private utility companies, as these companies are responsible for any damages 
caused, regardless of any fault or lack of foreseeability on the part of the 
company.21  
As part of the inverse condemnation doctrine, entities that cause damages to 
private citizens are also required to pay the attorneys’ fees of these citizens.22 
Therefore, California’s inverse condemnation doctrine is an example of a fee-
shifting statute that overcomes the default American Rule. This statute comes 
into play in situations like the California wildfires, as there are a number of 
 
 13 See Solomon Genet, Your Contingency Fee May Be at Risk if Your Client Files for Bankruptcy, DAILY 
BUS. REV. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://melandrussin.com/app/uploads/2018/04/MRB-DBR-Yourcontingencyfeemay 
beatriskifyourclientfilesforbankruptcy-mediaclip-10.18.171.pdf. 
 14 Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2000). 
 15 In re PG&E Corp., 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1706, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 28, 2019).  
 16 George Avalos, PG&E Must Face Tubbs Wildfire Victims in State Court: Bankruptcy Ruling, THE 
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019, 7:50 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/08/16/pge-must-face-tubbs-
wildfire-victims-in-state-court-bankruptcy-ruling/. 
 17 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1036. 
 18 League of California Cities, Inverse Condemnation Fact Sheet, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOC. OF 
COUNTIES, https://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/inverse_condemnation_fact_sheet_ 
league__csac.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).  
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. 
 22 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1036. 
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victims who want compensation for their damages as a part of a large mass tort 
lawsuit. Creditors will primarily use contingency agreements with their 
attorneys in these mass tort cases, leading to a high proportion of recovery for 
attorneys. Due to the strict liability in inverse condemnation and the fact that this 
matter is being handled by a bankruptcy judge instead of a jury trial, there is no 
risk of non-recovery for tort victims in the PG&E case. The creditors’ attorneys 
in the PG&E case will likely gain an unjust windfall because the usual risk of 
non-recovery in contingency cases is absent in the PG&E case. The Code does 
not cover this unique situation where the debtor is required to pay the tort 
victim’s attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the bankruptcy court in the PG&E case 
likely will not have any power under the Code to review these claims for 
attorneys’ fees.  
If a creditor submitted a claim for unreasonable attorneys’ fees, the debtor’s 
estate would be required to pay this unreasonable claim at the same pro rata 
proportion as the legitimate claims of tort victims with actual injuries. In this 
situation, the tort victim’s attorneys are able to take advantage of two parties. 
Not only can they take advantage of the tort victim through an unfair fee 
arrangement, but they are also able to unjustly take resources from the debtor’s 
estate without any review by a bankruptcy judge. For a court of equity, this is an 
inequitable solution.23 
D. Roadmap 
This Comment will discuss how the Code’s provisions for paying a 
creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees are underdeveloped. Because the Code lacks 
clear instruction on how to treat claims for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees, 
bankruptcy judges lack the explicit power to review unreasonable claims by a 
creditor for their attorneys’ fees, even though these judges can review and cap 
the fees of all other attorneys. The 2019 PG&E bankruptcy case will be a case 
study for how this rare problem can arise in bankruptcy. There are a number of 
possible outcomes from the PG&E case, many of which will be analyzed 
through this Comment; however, this Comment will not continue to track the 
case’s ongoing status. While the California court may resolve the attorneys’ fees 
issue in the PG&E case through judge-made determinations, this gap in the Code 
would still exist for future cases until Congress or the Supreme Court resolves 
the issue.  
 
 23 Infra Section II, A. 
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This Comment will make two primary arguments. First, while a minority of 
courts have argued that creditors’ attorneys can never submit claims for their 
fees, this Comment argues that the Code does permit creditors’ attorneys to 
submit claims for their fees. So long as a creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees is 
enforceable under the relevant non-bankruptcy law,24 the Code does not prohibit 
attorneys who represent creditors from submitting a line-item for their fees 
within the creditor’s claim. Second, because creditors’ attorneys are allowed to 
submit line-items for their fee claims under the Code, this Comment argues that 
there should be an amendment to the Code providing bankruptcy judges with a 
mechanism to control these claims. These judges already have the power to 
review all other claims for attorneys’ fees, as bankruptcy courts have broad 
discretion in determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.25 Because 
creditors’ attorneys are rarely allowed to attach line items for their fees to 
creditors’ claims, Congress may not have anticipated this rare situation where 
they would need to give judges the power to review this portion of a claim. By 
leaving this out of the Code, Congress created a gap in how to treat claims by 
creditors’ attorneys for their fees. This gap in the Code could lead to inequitable 
treatment of attorneys in the PG&E case. The gap could also deprive other more 
deserving claimants of payment from the estate, while giving creditor’s 
attorneys a windfall at the expense of all other unsecured creditors—including 
the injured tort victims themselves.26 If judges could prevent payment of 
unreasonable attorneys’ fees there would be more money in the estate. It is the 
“province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult 
policy questions embedded in the [Code].”27 Therefore, Congress should amend 
the Code to provide bankruptcy judges with the power to limit a creditor’s claim 
for their attorneys’ fees if this portion of the claim is unreasonable.  
I. BACKGROUND LAW 
A. Mechanics of Paying Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy 
To understand how the bankruptcy court in the PG&E case might handle a 
tort-victim creditor’s claim for his attorneys’ fees, there are a number of claim 
allowance issues we must first resolve. The attorneys’ fees will be permitted as 
 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2019); see Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).  
 25 In re First Colonial Corp., 544 F.2d 1291, 1298 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 26 See generally Resnick, supra note 14 at 2050 (the bankruptcy system has a goal of providing equal 
treatment among similar situated claimants). 
 27 Michael L. Cook, Court Wrongly Disallows Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fee, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 
2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/154014/Law360-Court-Wrongly-Disallows-
Lender-s-Post-Bankruptcy-Legal-Fe.pdf.  
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a claim in bankruptcy, and we must understand the status of that claim to know 
whether the claim is allowed or disallowed under the exceptions in section 
502(b)(1)–(9) of the Code. This decision requires a multi-step analysis. First, the 
court must decide whether there is a claim by a creditor. Second, the court must 
decide the status of the claim. Third, the court will use the preceding information 
to decide whether the claim is allowed or disallowed. Fourth, if the claim has 
been allowed, the court will decide whether the claim should remain at 
unsecured status or be elevated to secured status. 
1. The Creditors Will Have a “Claim” for their Attorneys’ Fees 
Creditors must first get their claims approved through the claim allowance 
process to be eligible for distributions from a debtor. The first step of this process 
is filing a Proof of Claim.28 The Code broadly defines a claim as any “right to 
payment” regardless of whether that right is reduced to a judgment, fixed or 
contingent, matured or unmatured, or secured or unsecured.29 While the status 
of a claim—contingent, unmatured, or unsecured—may have an effect on how 
it gets paid as the bankruptcy progresses, the claim’s status does not matter at 
the initial filing stage.30 Therefore, while the tort victims do not yet have a 
judgment against PG&E, this does not affect a tort victim’s ability to file a Proof 
of Claim in bankruptcy. On this form, the creditor writes the total amount of the 
claim.31 If the total amount of the claim includes other interests or charges, the 
form requires creditors to attach a statement itemizing these fees.32 In one Proof 
of Claim filed by a tort victim for the PG&E bankruptcy case, this itemized 
statement included “attorneys’ fees calculated at 33.33% of $832,000.00 
estimated value for property damages recoverable under the doctrine of inverse 
condemnation.”33  
2. The “Status” of the Creditor’s Claims for Attorneys’ Fees 
Second, after the court has established that there is a claim, the judge must 
decide the status of this claim. This label helps the judge when he eventually 
must decide whether the claim is allowed or disallowed.34 
 
 28 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2019). 
 29 Id. § 101(5)(a). 
 30 See generally In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 395 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (proof of claim is prima facie 
valid). 
 31 E.g., Adams Proof of Claim, supra note 9, at 66.  
 32 E.g., Adams Proof of Claim, supra note 9, at Attachment A. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 502 (providing the grounds for claim allowance). 
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a. Pre-Petition and Post-Petition Claims 
In bankruptcy, only “creditors” can file claims.35 A creditor is an entity with 
a right to payment against the debtor that arose before the debtor filed a petition 
for bankruptcy relief.36 These rights to payment are known as “pre-petition” 
claims.37 The tort victims in the PG&E case are creditors because the California 
inverse condemnation statute gave the tort victims a right to payment against 
PG&E at the moment they were injured by the wildfires.38 Therefore, the tort 
victims possess pre-petition claims against PG&E because their right to payment 
existed before the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief.39 On the other hand, if a tort 
victim was injured after a debtor filed her petition for bankruptcy, then the tort 
victim would possess a “post-petition” claim. This chronological distinction 
between pre-petition and post-petition claims becomes more complex when 
layering in the contingent status of a claim.  
b. Contingent Claims 
The contingent status of a claim does not provide grounds to disallow a claim 
in bankruptcy.40 A contingent claim is a claim in which the claimant’s right to 
payment depends on the occurrence of a future event.41 Contingent claims can 
arise both pre-petition and post-petition. A claim for attorneys’ fees is a 
contingent claim that generally arises pre-petition. In a bankruptcy case, an 
attorney works for a creditor—filing the claim, litigating issues of bankruptcy—
after the debtor files for bankruptcy. In some situations, these fees were agreed 
upon in a contract signed before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. For example, if 
the creditor and debtor had a working relationship pre-bankruptcy, part of their 
pre-bankruptcy contract may have stated that if the debtor ever ended up in 
bankruptcy, the debtor would pay attorneys’ fees incurred by the creditor. 
Therefore, the creditor’s right to payment in this situation is a “contingent right 
to post-petition attorneys’ fees.”42 The right to payment is contingent because 
the fees depend on the debtor entering into bankruptcy. The right to payment of 
fees is incurred post-petition because the attorneys’ fees are incurred through an 
attorneys’ services in the bankruptcy process. But, the fact that these fees were 
 
 35 Id. § 101(10)(A). 
 36 Id. 
 37 E.g., id. § 507. 
 38 See CAL. CONST. art. I § 19(a). 
 39 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). 
 40 Id. § 502(b)(1). 
 41 See generally id. § 101(5)(A) (noting that contingent claims constitute claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
 42 Cook, supra note 27. 
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incurred during a post-petition period is irrelevant for determining when the 
right to payment for these fees arose.43 Because this contractual right to the 
creditor’s attorneys’ fees was agreed upon before the debtor filed the petition for 
bankruptcy, the creditor’s attorneys gained their right to payment pre-petition, 
making this a pre-petition claim. Therefore, fees incurred through attorney 
services conducted post-petition, under a pre-petition contract right, are known 
as pre-petition contingent claims.44 While the attorneys’ fees are incurred 
through litigation occurring post-petition, the contingent right to these post-
petition fees existed pre-petition because of the contractual right to the fees.45  
Tort-victim creditors generally will not have these sorts of pre-petition 
contractual agreements with the debtor. Commercial contracts between 
sophisticated businesses often have provisions permitting lenders to recover 
their attorneys’ fees if they are trying to collect a debt that is in default.46 In 
bankruptcy, it is not unusual to see claims for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees based 
on these pre-petition contractual agreements. However, unlike business 
creditors, the tort victims’ relationship with the debtor was involuntary, 
beginning when the debtor committed the tortious act. Therefore, while the tort 
victims might have a right to payment for their injuries, in most cases they will 
not have an accompanying pre-petition right to their attorneys’ fees because the 
tort victims’ creditors did not have the chance to negotiate this right with the 
debtor.  
The PG&E bankruptcy presents the unique situation where a creditor’s 
attorneys’ right to payment of their fees exists because of an applicable state 
statute, instead of a pre-petition contractual right.47 Under the California inverse 
condemnation statute, tort victims are given the right to be compensated for their 
injuries.48 The statute also provides for fee-shifting of any attorneys’ fees 
incurred by the creditor. The tort victims’ right to payment for both their injuries 
and their attorneys’ fees arises simultaneously at the time of injury. Therefore, 
the tort victims in PG&E possessed this statutory right to payment of attorneys’ 
fees, pre-petition, and therefore have a pre-petition claim.49  
 
 43 See In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 B.R. 248, 262 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 44 See Sec. Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 156 (1928). 
 45 Id. at 156; see In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 B.R. at 262. 
 46 RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 6A.02 
(1986). 
 47 See CAL. CONST. art. I § 19.  
 48 See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1036 (noting the costs incurred in attempting to recover 
compensation for injuries is also included). 
 49 See In re Cohen, 191 B.R. 599, 609 (D.N.J. 1996) (“the non-compensatory aspect of the award in this 
case was codified and therefore entirely foreseeable by the debtor at the time he made the false representations 
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For the purposes of this Comment, the discussion will not address what 
happens if any tort victims are injured after PG&E files their petition for 
bankruptcy. In many mass-tort cases, such as asbestos litigation,50 plaintiffs 
continue to be injured as the bankruptcy process occurs. Because the injuries 
themselves arose post-petition, they are no longer contingent pre-petition claims. 
While there is a live debate about the allowance of post-petition attorneys’ 
fees,51 this Comment will limit the discussion to the recovery of pre-petition 
attorneys’ fees for the sake of simplicity.  
c. Unmatured Claims 
An unmatured claim is a claim in which a right to payment is owed to a 
creditor, but not yet due to that creditor.52 The tort victims’ claims are not 
unmatured because the entire amount of their claim became due at the time of 
injury. This term will become relevant for this Comment during the discussion 
of section 506 of the Code in Section II.A.253 because this provision allows 
specific creditors to collect their unmatured contract interest and attorneys’ 
fees.54 
3. A Creditor’s Claim for Their Attorneys’ Fees Will Be Allowable Under 
§ 502(a) So Long as There Are No Objections Under § 502(b) 
After deciding whether a creditor has a claim, the bankruptcy court will then 
decide whether a creditor’s claim should be allowed or disallowed through the 
analysis provided in section 502 of the Code.55 Under section 502(a) of the Code, 
all claims submitted by creditors are initially deemed “allowed,” permitting 
creditors to receive a distribution from the bankruptcy estate.56 If there is no 
provision within section 502(b) of the Code that disallows the claim,57 then the 
claim will remain allowed.58 But if a party objects under this section, stating that 
one of the provisions from section 502(b)(1)–(9) is applicable, then the claim 
 
to the plaintiffs. In this sense it may properly be seen as the debt he incurred through his conduct, rather than as 
punishment”). 
 50 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. SDNY, 1986) (an example of asbestos 
litigation). 
 51 This debate is known as the ‘United Merchant’s issue’. See Cook, supra note 27 (citing In re United 
Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982)).  
 52 See 11 U.S.C. §101(5)(A) (2019). 
 53 Infra Section II.A.2. 
 54 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(4), 506; see In re Redeker, 27 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). 
 55 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)–(b). 
 56 Id. § 502(a). 
 57 See id. § 502(b). 
 58 Id. § 502(a). 
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may be disallowed in part or in whole to the extent that the objection applies to 
that claim.59  
(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this 
title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects. 
(b) . . . If such objection is made, the court . . . shall determine the 
amount of such claim . . . and shall allow such claim in such amount, 
except to the extent that [provisions (b)(1)–(9) apply to the claim].60 
For example, a claim for “services of an insider or attorney of the debtor” 
may be disallowed in part under section 502(b)(4) if a party raises the objection 
that “such claim exceeds the reasonable value of such services.”61 If the court 
finds that the claim for services is reasonable, this provision does not apply and 
the claim will be allowed in full. On the other hand, if the court finds that claim 
“exceeds the reasonable value of such services,” then the court will disallow the 
unreasonable portion of the claim.62 As a court of equity, the bankruptcy court 
is therefore able to award these attorneys with less than the amount contracted 
for between the parties.63 It is important to note that while section 502(b)(4) 
expressly disallows unreasonable claims for the services of an attorney of the 
debtor, there is no identical Code provision for the services of an attorney of the 
creditor.  
4. Elevation of Allowed Secured Claims 
After a claim is deemed allowed under section 502 of the Code, the 
bankruptcy court will determine the allowed claim’s secured status under section 
506. If a claimant has a lien on the debtor’s property, that creditor’s claim will 
be elevated to “secured” status to the extent of the value of the property. When 
there is no property securing the claim, that creditor’s claim remains 
“unsecured.” There are two primary reasons why the secured status of the claim 
matters.  
First, in a chapter 7 liquidation, which affects the base recovery in other 
bankruptcy chapters, secured creditors will generally receive full payment on 
their claims before any unsecured creditor receives a distribution.64 Secured 
creditors have a much better chance of repayment than unsecured creditors 
 
 59 Id. § 502(b). 
 60 Id. § 502 (emphasis added). 
 61 Id. § 502(b)(4).  
 62 Id. 
 63 In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). 
 64 11 U.S.C. §§ 725–726. 
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because the bankruptcy estate has a finite amount of resources to pay back the 
creditors. 
Second, section 506 gives additional benefits to some secured creditors.65 
Secured creditors generally receive distributions on their claim at an earlier stage 
than unsecured creditors. But if a creditor’s claim is over-secured—meaning the 
property securing the lien exceeds the value of the claim—then that creditor can 
receive secured status on both his allowed claim and his allowed attorneys’ 
fees.66 If a creditor’s claim is fully secured—meaning the property value is equal 
to the value of his claim—he still receives secured status on his claim, but his 
allowed attorneys’ fees will remain at unsecured status. Hence, for the purposes 
of this Comment, discussion will be limited to the difference between unsecured 
and over-secured claims for attorneys’ fees. 
B. Claims for Attorneys’ Fees After the Travelers Case 
In Travelers, the United States Supreme Court established that section 
502(b) of the Code did not categorically disallow contractual claims for 
attorneys’ fees.67 The creditor and debtor had a contract containing indemnity 
provisions, which provided that the debtor had to pay the creditor’s attorneys’ 
fees in any litigation related to the contract.68 The debtor then argued that 
creditors could not recover attorneys’ fees from the debtor while litigating these 
disputes about the bankruptcy process.69 The bankruptcy court, district court, 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the debtor’s position, 
following the Ninth Circuit precedent in Fobian.70 Under the Fobian rule, all 
post-petition attorneys’ fees were disallowed in bankruptcy, even if a contract 
enforceable under the applicable state law created a valid claim for these 
attorneys’ fees.71  
 
 65 See id. § 506(b), stating:  
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any 
recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall 
be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or 
charges provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose. 
 66 Id.; see FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016; In re Am. Metals Corp., 31 B.R. 229, 237 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).  
 67 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 445 (2007). Note that while PG&E was also 
a litigant in this case, this was a separate bankruptcy filing for PG&E from April 2001. 
 68 See id. at 446.  
 69 See id. at 447–48.  
 70 See id. 
 71 See In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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When the creditor appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Court upheld the creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees, overruling the Ninth’s 
Circuit’s Fobian rule.72 The Supreme Court stated that the Fobian rule was in 
direct opposition to the logic of section 502(b).73 Under section 502(b), a claim 
enforceable under state law is only disallowed in bankruptcy if the claim falls 
within one of the nine exceptions listed in the provision.74 While one exception 
in section 502(b) disallows claims for services of an attorney of the debtor,75 
there is no analogous provision in section 502(b) disallowing all claims for 
services of an attorney.76 Yet, in Travelers, the Supreme Court declined to 
answer whether other provisions of the Code might disallow a claim for 
attorneys’ fees.77  
A minority of courts have used this gap in Travelers to hold that section 506 
is a claim allowance provision that allows attorneys’ fees for over-secured 
creditors and disallows attorneys’ fees for unsecured creditors.78 Therefore, the 
issue of claim allowance for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees remains unsettled under 
the current version of the Code. Because it is unclear whether the Code even 
allows certain claims for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees in the first place, this 
Comment will resolve that issue before addressing whether these allowed claims 
for a creditor’s attorneys’ fees must also be reasonable.  
II. ARGUMENT 
As the Code currently stands, there is no provision that disallows a creditor’s 
claim for attorneys’ fees.79 While a minority of courts have argued that the 
Code’s silence on the issue means that these fees are not allowed,80 this position 
is inconsistent with the Code’s treatment of claims more generally. The first part 
of this section will discuss why the majority view is correct, and that a creditor’s 
claim for attorneys’ fees will be allowed in bankruptcy unless the fees are 
unenforceable under any agreement or the relevant state law.81 Because 
 
 72 See Travelers, 549 U.S. at 452–53. 
 73 See id. at 452.  
 74 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2)–(9) (2019). 
 75 Id. § 502(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
 76 See Travelers, 549 U.S. at 453. 
 77 See id. at 455–56.  
 78 See Geoffrey L. Berman & Peter M. Gilhuly, Recovering Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in Bankruptcy 
Cases, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32–33 (2000).  
 79 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 
 80 E.g., In re Trib. Media Co., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3973, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2015); In re Old 
Colony, LLC, 476 B.R. 1, 31–32 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). 
 81 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). 
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creditors’ attorneys can attach claims for their fees to the creditor’s claim, the 
second part of this section will discuss why the Code should be amended to give 
judges the power to restrict these claims to a reasonable amount. While there are 
a few ways this amendment could be structured, the most effective change would 
be an expansion of section 502(b)(4). With this amendment, claims for services 
of all attorneys, not just attorneys of the debtor, would be disallowed to the 
extent the “claim exceeds the reasonable value of such [attorney] services.”82 
There are many policy reasons supporting this amendment. Creditors’ attorneys 
should not be able to collect a windfall judgment of unreasonable fees, while all 
other attorneys in bankruptcy are restricted to the reasonable value of the claim 
for attorneys’ fees.  
A.  Disputes About the Current Code: The Code Does Not Disallow a 
Creditor’s Claims for Attorneys’ Fees 
Creditors’ attorneys’ fees are allowed in bankruptcy when provided for by 
an enforceable contract or an applicable state law.83 Generally, the American 
Rule does not require the debtor to pay the attorneys’ fees of their creditors, 
instead, parties are required to pay their own fees. 84 But there are a number of 
mechanisms allowing prevailing parties to overcome the American Rule and 
shift their fees onto the losing party.85 There are two primary mechanisms for 
fee-shifting: enforceable contracts providing for attorneys’ fees and fee-shifting 
statutes.86  
Fee-shifting provisions in contracts are not unusual in bankruptcy 
proceedings.87 Occasionally, creditors will have created pre-bankruptcy 
contracts with the debtor addressing the recovery of legal fees if the parties ever 
get involved in litigation.88 By allowing these claims in bankruptcy, courts are 
“merely effectuat[ing] the bargained-for terms of the [debtor’s pre-bankruptcy 
contracts].”89  
 
 82 Id. § 502(b)(4). 
 83 See id. § 502(b)(1) (A creditor’s claim will be allowed, other than to the extent “such claim is 
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason 
other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured”). 
 84 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007); In re Lane Poultry of 
Carolina, Inc., 63 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986). 
 85 See Travelers, 549 U.S. at 448. 
 86 See e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I § 19. 
 87 See e.g., In re United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 88 Cook, supra note 27 (“At least five [Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits], if not six, 
circuits have now put to rest the contractual post-bankruptcy legal fee issue”). 
 89 United Merchs, 674 F.2d at 137; see In re Lane Poultry of Carolina, Inc., 63 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1986) (the future debtor has therefore consented to the attorneys’ fees in advance: the fees are not 
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On the other hand, it is “relatively rare” to see bankruptcy cases where 
claims for attorneys’ fees are based on a fee-shifting statute.90 Because tort 
victims will not have pre-petition contracts with the debtor, they generally 
cannot rely on pre-bankruptcy contracts to collect their attorneys’ fees. Instead, 
these tort victims must rely on these rare fee-shifting statutes if they are going 
to overcome the American Rule.91  
If the tort victims filed their injury claims against PG&E outside of 
bankruptcy, they could take advantage of California’s doctrine of inverse 
condemnation and collect their attorneys’ fees in court from PG&E.92 Even 
though PG&E has filed for bankruptcy, the result in the bankruptcy court should 
be no different.93 The bankruptcy claim allowance process will allow these 
creditors’ claims for attorneys’ fees because the fees have been provided for by 
the applicable state law of California.94   
1. Tort Victim’s Claim for Attorneys’ Fees Will be Allowed under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502 
A tort victim’s claim for their attorneys’ fees will be allowed unless a party 
in interest objects to this claim, citing an exception listed in section 502(b) of 
the Code.95 Most of these section 502(b) exceptions will not be relevant for a 
creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees because this type of claim does not implicate 
an “unmatured interest [or debt,]”96 a “tax assessed against property of the 
estate,”97 “services of an insider or attorney of the debtor,”98 damages resulting 
from “termination of a lease” or an “employment contract,”99 or “late 
payment . . . [of] an employment tax.”100 A party in interest also cannot properly 
object under section 502(b)(9), assuming the tort victim filed his claim timely.101 
 
some arbitrary amount imposed by the court in excess of what a debtor would have agreed to in advance). 
 90 Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 91 Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 92 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2019); CAL. CONST. art. I § 19.  
 93 See generally In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1003 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (“The fact that a 
lift of stay was never obtained so that MBL could pursue other legal or judicial methods of collection should not 
prevent it from recovering its attorney fees when the amount was collected through bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 94 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (the claim is not “unenforceable . . . under any agreement or applicable 
law”). 
 95 Id. § 502(b)(2)–(9). 
 96 Id. § 502(b)(2). 
 97 Id. § 502(b)(3). 
 98 Id. § 502(b)(4). 
 99 Id. § 502(b)(6)–(7). 
 100 Id. § 502(b)(8). 
 101 See id. § 502 (b)(9). 
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Therefore, while the exceptions provided in section 502(b)(2)–(9) have no 
impact on a creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees,102 a party in interest can attempt 
to object under section 502(b)(1).103  
If a party objects to a claim under section 502(b)(1), that claim will only be 
disallowed if it is “unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, 
under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such 
claim is contingent or unmatured.”104 In other words, the tort victim’s claim for 
attorneys’ fees would be disallowed if the claim was deemed unenforceable 
under California’s state law.105 This provision reflects how the “basic federal 
rule in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of claims.”106 If there 
is no relevant intervening principle from bankruptcy law or federal law, the 
validity of a claim is determined in accordance with the relevant state law.107  
In the tort victims’ case, their attorneys’ fees claims come from California 
state law of inverse condemnation,108 showing that their claims are clearly 
enforceable under the applicable state law.109 In addition, section 502(b)(1) of 
the Code establishes that the contingent status of a claim for fees is not a grounds 
for disallowance.110 This determination is consistent with the decision in 
Travelers, which held that section 502(b) did not categorically disallow a claim 
for attorneys’ fees.111 Therefore, section 502(b) will not present obstacles to 
plaintiffs in the PG&E case who are including their attorneys’ claims for fees as 
part of their own bankruptcy claim.112 A bankruptcy judge would therefore allow 
 
 102 See id. § 502(b)(2)–(9). 
 103 See id. § 502(b)(1). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 106 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007). 
 107 See id. at 450–51. 
 108 See CAL. CONST. art. I § 19; Belair v. Riverside Cty. Flood Control Dist., 47 Cal. 3d 550, 558 (1988). 
 109 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 456 F.3d 668, 683 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2019). The Southern District of New York, however, disagreed with this 
interpretation of the Code, instead finding:  
[C]laimants’ right to attorneys’ fees were contingent upon their . . . obtaining an award of 
attorneys’ fees in their judgments. Commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings eliminated the 
possibility that the contingency would ever come to pass. Accordingly, claimants [do not have a] 
right to payment of their prepetition attorneys’ fees. Without a right to payment, Claimants have 
no claim.  
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 148 B.R. 979, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted).  
 111 Travelers, 549 U.S. at 453.  
 112 See Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 223 (1998). 
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the tort victims’ claims for attorneys’ fees to continue, as there is no basis for 
disallowing this claim.113 
2. Jurisdictional Split Surrounding 11 U.S.C. § 506 
There are additional obstacles for a creditor who is making a claim for their 
attorneys’ fees in a bankruptcy case. While the Supreme Court in Travelers 
established that section 502(b) did not categorically disallow a creditor’s claims 
for attorneys’ fees,114 the Supreme Court declined to answer whether other 
provisions in the Code would prevent these claims from being allowed against 
the debtor.115 This gap has led to uncertainty among lower courts, where the 
success of a creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees depends on both the status of the 
claim and the jurisdiction where the case is filed.116 If a claim is over-secured 
under section 506(b), the Code explicitly provides that the holder of that over-
secured claim “shall be allowed . . . any reasonable fees, costs, or charges 
provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim 
arose.”117 While a majority of courts believe that this provision merely elevates 
certain over-secured claims, a minority of courts have interpreted this provision 
to mean that for any creditor’s claim that is not over-secured, that claim will be 
disallowed. The tort victims in PG&E’s bankruptcy are involuntary creditors and 
have no collateral securing their allowed claim.118 Therefore, the tort victims are 
unsecured creditors who do not fall within the instruction of section 506(b) for 
over-secured creditors. Depending on the jurisdiction, there are two primary 
ways a court could rule on the allowance of the unsecured creditor’s claim for 
attorneys’ fees. 
a. Minority Point of View of 11 U.S.C. § 506 
Some courts119 have ruled that unsecured creditors are never entitled to assert 
claims for attorneys’ fees.120 Courts taking this view note that section 506(b) 
explicitly provides attorneys’ fees for over-secured claims. By implication, these 
 
 113 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 
 114 See Travelers, 549 U.S. at 453–55. 
 115 See id. at 445.  
 116 See Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 117 11 U.S.C. § 506. 
 118 See generally id. § 101(37) (defining a lien to obtain a secured claim). 
 119 E.g., In re Trib. Media Co., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3973, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2015); In re Old 
Colony, LLC, 476 B.R. 1, 32 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). 
 120 Note that sometimes these courts only limit post-petition claims for attorneys’ fees while allowing pre-
petition claims for attorneys’ fees, but that this Comment is not exploring that issue. See, e.g., Summitbridge 
Nat’l Inv. III, LLC v. Faison, 915 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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courts find that section 502(b) must not provide attorneys’ fees to unsecured 
claims.121 Otherwise, the fee provision in section 506(b) would be redundant.122 
These courts point out how Congress explicitly expressed their intent to provide 
attorneys’ fees in a number of other Code provisions: section 330 (“the court 
may award to the trustee . . . or a professional person . . . reasonable 
compensation for actual, necessary services”); section 503 (allowing an 
administrative expense of “reasonable compensation for professional services 
rendered by an attorney”); and section 523(d) (“the debtors costs of, and a 
reasonable attorneys’ fees for . . .”).123 Other than these enumerated exceptions, 
Congress did not intend for debtors to pay another party’s attorneys’ fees.124 This 
argument was made in the respondent’s brief in Travelers.125 The Supreme Court 
in Travelers declined to answer whether section 502(b) disallowed an unsecured 
creditor’s claim for contractual attorneys’ fees because this issue was raised for 
the first time on appeal.126 If the minority perspective was correct, then 
unsecured creditors could never file a claim for their attorneys’ fees, even if there 
was a valid contract or state statute providing for those fees.127 
There are also policy reasons to support this minority interpretation of 
section 506(b). While the tort victims in the PG&E case can rely on the inverse 
 
 121 See In re Pride Co., L.P., 285 B.R. 366, 375 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); Laith Hamdan, Note, Creditor 
Claims for Postpetition Attorneys’ Fees Incurred in Bankruptcy Litigation and the Role of State Law, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2279, 2289 (2016) (“negative pregnant of § 506(b) is that contractually authorized attorneys’ 
fees may not be awarded to those who do not have oversecured claims—that is, unsecured and undersecured 
creditors.”). 
 122 Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 19, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007).  
 123 See In re Seda France, Inc., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2874, at *7–8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 22, 2011). 
 124 See id. at *9; The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed:  
Because §506(b) . . . expressly provides for the allowance of postpetition attorneys’ fees for 
oversecured creditors, and neither §506(b) nor any other provision . . . provides for the allowance 
of such fees for unsecured creditors, it follows that unsecured creditors have no clear entitlement 
to postpetition attorneys’ fees. 
In re Glob. Indus. Techs., 327 B.R. 230, 239–40 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005). 
 125 Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 19, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007). 
 126 In Travelers, the Supreme Court found:  
PG&E did not raise these arguments below. . . [W]e ordinarily do not consider claims that were 
neither raised nor addressed below . . . and PG&E has failed to identify any circumstances that 
would warrant an exception to that rule in this case. We therefore will not consider these 
arguments. 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 455 (2007). 
 127 See, e.g., In re Old Colony, 476 B.R. 1, 31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); see Trib. Media Co., 2015 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3973, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2015) (Denying unsecured creditors their attorneys’ fees may not 
leave creditors without recourse, if they can establish that these services substantially benefitted the bankruptcy 
estate and are therefore eligible for post-petition administrative expense status under section 503(b)(3)). 
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condemnation statute to make their claim for attorneys’ fees, these fee-shifting 
statutes are “relatively rare.”128 In the typical mass tort case, unsecured creditors 
have no means of recovering their attorneys’ fees. Unlike secured creditors, 
creditors with unsecured claims (such as tort victims) rarely have pre-bankruptcy 
contracts with the debtor that provide for payment of attorneys’ fees. Instead, 
these unsecured creditors are involuntary creditors, who can only rely on 
statutes—like California’s inverse condemnation statute—for the chance to 
recover their attorneys’ fees.129 If only this specific group of unsecured creditors 
within the class of all unsecured creditors were able to recover their attorneys’ 
fees, this would create a disadvantage for the other unsecured creditors in that 
class.  
The discussion in Laith Hamdan’s note provides a helpful illustration of this 
principle.130 In his illustration, there are two creditors. Creditor A is a tort victim 
who has received a $20,000 money judgment against the debtor.131 Creditor B 
is a credit card company that is owed $20,000 by the debtor under a credit 
agreement.132 Both parties also incur $5,000 of fees while litigating their case. 
Both Creditor A and Creditor B can submit claims for the $20,000 they are owed. 
If the bankruptcy estate has $20,000 to pay its two creditors, each creditor will 
receive 50% of what they were owed, or $10,000.133 But suppose Creditor B has 
a contract with the debtor arranging for reimbursement of any fees incurred in 
enforcing their agreement. Now, Creditor B is able to submit a claim for $25,000 
while Creditor A’s claim remains at $20,000. Because creditors receive a 50% 
pro rata share of what they are owed,134 Creditor B will now recover over 
$11,000, having the ability to “increase its claim and recover more of [the 
debtor’s assets] at [the expense of Creditor] A,” who now receives less than 
$9,000.135 In sum, allowing unsecured creditors to assert a claim for attorneys’ 
fees is often against tort victims’ best interest.136 These policy reasons support 
the minority interpretation of section 506(b), which would deny all unsecured 
creditors the right to claim attorneys’ fees, even if there was an enforceable fee-
shifting contract or applicable state law. 
 
 128 Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 129 CAL. CONST. art. I § 19. 
 130 Hamdan, supra note 121 at 2285.  
 131 Id.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (emphasis added). 
 135 Id.  
 136 See generally Corinne McCarthy, Comment, Creditor’s Committee: Giving Tort Claimants a Voice in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 431, 444 (2015) (arguing tort victims should receive 
their own creditor’s committee). 
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b. Majority Point of View of 11 U.S.C. § 506  
i. 11 U.S.C. § 506 is Not a Claim Disallowance Provision 
The more dominant view among courts is that unsecured creditors may assert 
a claim for their attorneys’ fees when that claim is provided for by an enforceable 
contract or state statute.137 This approach, followed by multiple circuit courts,138 
embraces the logic of the Code’s claim allowance process more closely. As 
previously explained, enforceable claims are generally allowed under section 
502(a) unless the claim is expressly disallowed under section 502(b).139 There is 
no exception under section 502(b) that differentiates between over-secured, fully 
secured, and under-secured claims. The only mention of secured status arises in 
section 506, which is not a claim allowance provision.140 Therefore, there is no 
reason to differentiate secured and unsecured claims at the claim allowance stage 
simply based on their secured status.141  
There is also no reason to believe that creditors’ claims for attorneys’ fees 
will be disallowed under section 502(b) if they are enforceable under a contract 
or the applicable state law.142 There is no provision of section 502(b) that 
expressly disallows these claims for attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the fees would 
be allowed under section 502(a).143 After a claim is allowed, the court would 
proceed to analyze the claim’s secured status under section 506. The trigger for 
section 506(a) is an “allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property,” 
demonstrating that a pre-requisite to applying this provision is that the claim has 
already been allowed under section 502.144 Therefore, section 506(a) could not 
be part of the initial claim allowance process because creditors must have an 
allowed claim to even utilize this provision.  
The creditor’s allowed claim is then broken down into its allowed secured 
and allowed unsecured components under section 506(a).145 A creditor’s secured 
claims will receive higher priority than unsecured claims during distribution of 
 
 137 See Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32; Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).  
 138 Cook, supra note 27.  
 139 Supra Section I.A.3. 
 140 In order to apply section 506, there must already be an “allowed” claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (“An 
allowed claim of a creditor . . . is a secured claim to the extent . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 141 See Cook, supra note 27. 
 142 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). 
 143 See In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 144 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 
 145 Id. 
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the debtor’s estate.146 In turn, the secured creditor has a higher likelihood of 
being paid because their claims are being distributed earlier in the bankruptcy 
process. Under section 506(b), if a claim is over-secured, the creditor also 
receives this higher distribution priority for any “interest on such claim, and any 
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State 
statute under which such claim arose.”147 When discussing reasonable “fees” 
under section 502(b)(6), the “fees” are understood to include attorneys’ fees to 
the extent enforceable under state law.148 While the minority of courts argue that 
this provision disallows all other attorneys’ fees, the more consistent view is that 
section 506(b) simply elevates a claim for reasonable attorneys’ fees for over-
secured creditors and provides this portion of the claim with secured status. A 
secured claim receives higher priority in bankruptcy than an unsecured claim. 
Therefore, attorneys’ fees attached to an over-secured claim will also receive 
this higher priority. 
The majority treatment of a creditor’s claims for attorneys’ fees can be 
illustrated by the following example. If a creditor had both an over-secured 
allowed claim and was entitled to attorneys’ fees under an enforceable contract 
or statute, the bankruptcy court would be required to analyze whether the 
creditor’s attorneys’ fees were “reasonable” under section 506(b).149 The 
reasonable portion of these fees would be elevated to a higher priority claim due 
to the claim’s secured status.150 The unreasonable portion, on the other hand, 
should be treated like an unsecured claim.151 The purpose of section 506 is to 
decide which allowed claims will have this secured status, and thus receive 
better treatment than an unsecured claim.152 Therefore, there is little reason to 
conclude that a claim for unreasonable over-secured fees, reasonable unsecured 
fees, or unreasonable unsecured fees should be disallowed just because section 
506(b) does not expressly provide these claims with secured status.153 Instead, 
these claims will still be allowable as unsecured claims under the provisions of 
section 502(b).154 
 
 146 See id. § 725–726(a)(1). 
 147 Id. § 506(b). 
 148 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 453 (2007). 
 149 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 
 150 See In re 268, Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 151 See id. at 678. 
 152 See 11 U.S.C. § 725–726. 
 153 See In re United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding no law or policy that 
supports the disallowance of claims for collection costs under an agreement).  
 154 See In re 268, Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678. 
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ii. Highlighting the Difference Between the Code’s Treatment of 
Creditors’ Claims for Attorneys’ Fees and Claims for Post-Petition 
Interest 
There is another reason to believe that the majority view is more consistent 
with the Code. Section 506(b) affects both a creditor’s claim for their attorneys’ 
fees and a creditor’s claim for unmatured interest by providing over-secured 
creditors with elevated claims for allowed post-petition attorneys’ fees and 
unmatured interest. But, historically, courts have argued that section 506(b) was 
a claim “allowance” provision, meaning a creditor’s claims for unmatured 
interest would only be allowed if the creditor’s claim was over-secured under 
section 506(b), as opposed to merely being elevated if the creditor’s claim was 
over-secured.155 But, U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, clarified that section 506(b) 
was not an allowance provision because unmatured interest already had an 
allowance provision, namely section 502(b)(2).156 Section 506(b) was merely a 
provision elevating the status of post-petition claims for unmatured interest. 
When courts view creditors’ claims for unmatured interest, they generally deem 
that no part of these claims are “allowed” or “disallowed” under section 506(b). 
Because courts do not deem these claims for unmatured interest as “allowed” or 
“disallowed” under 506(b), courts also should not consider section 506(b) as an 
allowance provision for creditors claiming attorneys’ fees to use section 506(b). 
While claims for both attorneys’ fees and post-petition interest are provided 
to over-secured creditors in section 506(b), these two claims are treated 
differently during the earlier claim allowance process. During the claim 
allowance process, there is no provision allowing a party to object to a creditor’s 
claim for attorneys’ fees. On the other hand, a party can object to “unmatured 
interest” on a claim, as provided in section 502(b)(2). If this objection is made, 
the court will disallow any post-petition interest. This is, however, only for the 
unmatured interest associated with a claim; unmatured claims are not disallowed 
according to section 502(b)(1).157 While claims for unmatured interest were 
disallowed during the claim allowance process, section 506(b) later seems to 
provide over-secured creditors with this unmatured “interest on such [allowed 
 
 155 See Post-Travelers Decisions Continue the Debate Regarding the Allowability of Unsecured Creditors’ 
Claims for Postpetition Attorneys’ Fees, JONES DAY (Sep. 2007), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2007/ 
10/post-travelers-decisions-continue-the-debate-regarding-the-allowability-of-unsecured-creditors-claims-for-
postpetition-attorneys-fees.  
 156 See Blaire Cahn, The Supreme Court Gets Its Grammar on: Interpreting the Right to Postpetition 
Interest Under Section 506(b), WEIL RESTRUCTURING BLOG (July 3, 2014), https://restructuring.weil.com/ 
throwback-thursday/u-s-v-ron-pair-enters/ (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)).  
 157 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (the claim will be disallowed if “such claim is unenforceable against the 
debtor . . . other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured”). 
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secured] claims, and any reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for under 
the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.”158  
Before Ron Pair, a court could have argued that section 506(b) reverses the 
effect of section 502(b)(2) for over-secured creditors by allowing their 
unmatured interest claims, and therefore that section 506 was a claim allowance 
provision for both unmatured interest as well as attorneys’ fees. But in Ron Pair, 
the Supreme Court held that section 506(b) creates an automatic entitlement to 
post-petition interest for unsecured creditors, regardless of whether an 
agreement or state statute provided for that interest.159 The Supreme Court found 
that the comma after “interest on such claim” in the text of section 506(b) 
segregated the “post-petition interest” from the other “reasonable fees and costs 
provided for within an agreement or state statute.”160 This finding demonstrates 
that section 506(b) does not “re-allow” the interest disallowed under section 
502(b)(2); the section 502(b)(2) interest remains disallowed. The new interest 
amounts, which are automatically elevated to secured status under section 
506(b), do not have to be provided for by the agreement or statute giving rise to 
the claim. While not discussed in this Comment, these interests are not 
considered claims, but instead are administrative expenses, which go through a 
different allowance process.161  
Therefore, section 506(b) does not re-allow the same claims initially made 
for unmatured interest, but instead gives over-secured claimants a separate right 
to unmatured interest that existed independent of their initial allowed claim. This 
potential redundancy issue fixed by Ron Pair never arose with the attorneys’ 
“fees and costs” described in section 506(b), since there is no corresponding 
disallowance provision from section 502(b). The language of section 506(b) was 
already clear that the attorneys’ fees and costs described in section 506(b) are 
not provided as an independent right, as the phrase “provided for under the 
agreement or State statute under which such claim arose” clearly modifies these 
fees and costs.162 Therefore, if an over-secured creditor wants to elevate the 
status of their over-secured claim for reasonable attorneys’ fees, the claim must 
already allow for these fees. These claims merely receive their elevated status 
through section 506(b); there is no evidence that this provision affects the 
allowance of these claims.  
 
 158 Id. § 506(b).  
 159 U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
 160 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).  
 161 See id. 
 162 Id. § 506(b). 
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3. By Taking the Majority View That the Code Does Not Disallow 
Creditors’ Claims for Attorneys’ Fees, the Code’s Gaps Involving 
Payment of These Fees Become Evident  
Because section 506(b) is not a claim allowance provision, and the majority 
view is correct that no provision from section 502(b) disallows creditors’ claims 
for attorneys’ fees, the Code clearly allows creditors’ attorneys’ claims for their 
fees in bankruptcy. Therefore, the tort victims’ attorneys’ claims will be allowed 
in the PG&E case because their claims are enforceable under the applicable 
California inverse condemnation law.163 Because the tort victims’ claims for 
attorneys’ fees are enforceable under applicable law, their claims will be 
allowable in bankruptcy unless the Code expressly disallows it.164 This 
allowance is inferred because of the absence of a disallowance provision. But 
this absence of a Code provision creates problems when it comes to a bankruptcy 
judge’s ability to cap any claims by creditor’s for unreasonable attorney fee 
payments. Unlike fee claims made by all other attorneys in bankruptcy, who 
have a provision authorizing only their “reasonable” fees, there is no analogous 
provision in the Code for creditor’s attorneys. This gap in the Code presumably 
means that judges have no discretion to cap claims for creditor’s attorneys’ fees. 
The second portion of this Section will argue that there should be a reasonability 
cap on creditor’s attorneys’ fees and will explain the reasoning for this argument. 
B. Proposed Changes: Inserting a Reasonability Cap for Creditor’s 
Attorneys’ Fees 
Currently, the Code is silent as to whether a bankruptcy judge has the power 
to review a creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees. If the judge in the PG&E case 
attempted to cap a tort victim’s claim for attorneys’ fees to its reasonable 
amount, the judge’s decision would likely be overruled because “fee 
arrangements [reached in a non-bankruptcy setting] between [tort victim] 
claimants and their attorneys lie beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”165 But, if 
there was a Code provision allowing judges to modify these non-bankruptcy 
rights, the judges would be able to restrict the creditors’ attorneys’ claims to 
their reasonable value.166  
 
 163 CAL. CONST. art. I § 19. 
 164 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 453 (2007). 
 165 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 166 See In re Qmect, Inc., 368 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[a]bsent a clear provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code modifying a creditor’s nonbankruptcy legal rights, the Court concludes that those rights should 
be deemed to be left intact.”). 
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This Comment will demonstrate multiple ways to add this reasonability cap 
to a creditor’s claims for attorneys’ fees. One proposed solution is that individual 
states could adopt their own maximum contingency fee rate recovery for 
contracts and fee-shifting statutes.167 This solution would ultimately be 
ineffective, as exemplified by California’s inverse condemnation statute.168 The 
other possible solutions involve amendments to the Code itself, which this 
Comment advocates is a more effective way of fixing the problem of 
unreasonable attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy. 
1. Inserting a Reasonability Cap into State Laws  
Through California’s inverse condemnation statute, tort victims are able to 
shift attorneys’ fees to the government unit or business who harmed their private 
property.169 California’s Code of Civil Procedure expands on this statute, stating 
that when a proceeding involves inverse condemnation, the court shall 
“reimburse the plaintiff’s costs, disbursements, and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney fees.”170 Therefore, a California court would only allow 
reasonable damages for attorneys’ fees and would not allow a claim for 
unreasonable damages. Because the source of allowable damages in bankruptcy 
law is state law, this statute suggests that an unreasonable claim for damages in 
bankruptcy would not be allowed by the underlying state law.171 While this 
provision seeks to remedy the problem of unreasonable fees identified in this 
Comment, the state law’s reasonability requirement is insufficient for two 
reasons.  
First, reasonability in the context of bankruptcy is often different from 
reasonability in the context of state law. In one California inverse condemnation 
case, the court awarded a plaintiff with the full amount of attorneys’ fees 
provided for in their contingency fee agreement, totaling 40% of plaintiff’s 
recovery.172 If this case ended up in bankruptcy before the plaintiff was able to 
collect on their judgment, there would be no mechanism for a judge to limit the 
attorneys’ ability to collect on their fees, even if it came at the expense of other 
 
 167 E.g., In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d 592, 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (“In Oklahoma, contingency fee 
contracts over fifty percent are valid and enforceable.”).  
 168 See CAL. CONST. art. I § 19. 
 169 See id.  
 170 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1036. 
 171 See In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 595; Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 172 See Pac. Shores Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 244 Cal. App. 4th 12, 62 (2016); In 
re Lane Poultry of Carolina, Inc., 63 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986) (previous fee agreements prevent 
creditors’ attorneys from “neglecting to draft a binding fee agreement with the hope that the Court will later 
define ‘reasonable fee’ in more generous and profitable terms than those consented to”). 
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more deserving creditors.173 In bankruptcy, there are a finite amount of resources 
within the estate to be distributed to all creditors. The bankruptcy court should 
therefore encourage the most equitable payout. If these attorneys’ fees cannot be 
restricted in the bankruptcy forum, they could “becom[e] a tool for wasteful 
diversion of an estate at the hands of secured creditors who, knowing that the 
estate must foot the bills, fail to exercise restraint in enforcement expenses.”174  
Second, any reasonability limitation prescribed under state law might be 
redundant in the bankruptcy context. While the validity of claims is dependent 
on the underlying state law,175 it is clear under section 506(b) that the bankruptcy 
court makes its own independent evaluation as to what constitutes reasonable 
fees.176 Therefore, if a claim for attorneys’ fees was not allowable under state 
law, but a bankruptcy court finds those fees to be allowed and reasonable, an 
award for these fees may still be granted.177 This conclusion reinforces that a 
reasonability limitation on attorneys’ fees within state law is likely an 
insufficient remedy in the bankruptcy context. 
2. Inserting a Reasonability Cap into the Code 
The preferred method of fixing the problem of unreasonable claims for a 
creditor’s attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy is an amendment by Congress to the 
Code itself. The reasonable portion of these fees would still be allowed, as 
currently provided in the Code, but this amendment would provide judges with 
the explicit power to disallow the unreasonable portion of a creditor’s attorneys’ 
claim fees. The bankruptcy court is a court of equity and should have the explicit 
power under the Code to assess all claims for attorneys’ fees against the debtor 
to determine their reasonability in the bankruptcy context.178 The Code plainly 
 
 173 See generally Resnick, supra note 14, at 2061 (“[w]hy should the corporation’s financial difficulties, 
caused primarily by mass tort liability . . . fall solely on the tort victims? Rather [all creditors] should share the 
pain of the corporation’s financial difficulties.”). 
 174 In re Wonder Corp. of Am., 82 B.R. 186, 189 (D. Conn. 1988). 
 175 See Ferrari v. Barclays Bus. Credit, 87 B.R. 745, 748 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). 
 176 See In re Breeden, 180 B.R. 802, 808 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1995); In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d 
592, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).  
 177 See, e.g., In re Va. Foundry Co., 9 B.R. 493, 497 (W.D. Va. 1981); The Ferrari case reached a similar 
conclusion: 
[A]lthough a liquidated damages charge may be reasonable and valid under Connecticut law 
because it was a reasonable estimate of the damages anticipated when the contract was made, that 
same charge will be valid and enforceable under § 506(b) only to the extent that the secured party 
actually incurred damages. 
Ferrari, 87 B.R. at 750.  
 178 See generally In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 597 (“a federal standard should guide the court 
in its judgment regarding the reasonableness of such damages in the context of bankruptcy.”); Wolohan Lumber 
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gives bankruptcy judges the power to cap unreasonable claims made by an 
attorney of the debtor, an authorized committee, the trustee, and all other 
professional persons—such as accountants or appraisers—hired by the 
trustee.179 The Code should give judges the analogous power to cap 
unreasonable claims made by a creditor for attorneys’ fees. Even though it is 
rare that creditors are able to submit claims with line-items for attorneys’ fees, 
this does not mean that the Code should not cover this specific situation. The 
remaining portion of this Section will discuss two proposed amendments to the 
Code, both of which I have crafted, and why those amendments should be 
implemented.  
a. Possible Mechanics of a Code Amendment 
In section 502(b)(4), Congress explicitly disallowed unreasonable claims for 
the services of an attorney, but this provision is only applicable to an attorney of 
the debtor.180 While section 502(b)(4) is not applicable to the services for an 
attorney of the creditor, there are two important takeaways that can be gathered 
through an examination of this provision. 
First, section 502(b)(4) provides a model for working with unreasonable 
claims for the services of an attorney. While the applicable state law determines 
whether attorneys’ fees are available as damages,181 the bankruptcy court looks 
to non-bankruptcy federal law to determine whether there will be a cap on the 
amount of the state law damages for attorneys’ fees.182 This cap ensures the state 
law damages are considered reasonable in the context of bankruptcy.183 Once 
the court has determined the reasonable amount of damages, then the claim for 
services of the debtor’s attorney is disallowed to the extent that the fees exceed 
their reasonable value.184  
Congress did not define reasonable compensation for an attorney within the 
Code. Therefore, bankruptcy courts must look to federal non-bankruptcy law for 
 
Co. v. Robbins, 21 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (“since payment of post-petition interest operates to 
deplete funds which would otherwise be available for subordinate creditors, equitable considerations may be 
invoked to prevent undue prejudice to junior creditors.”). 
 179 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 330, 502(b)(4), 523(d) (2019). 
 180 Section 504(b)(4) also applies to insiders of the debtor, such as the officers and directors of the debtor, 
but this is less relevant for our analysis. See In re Allegheny Int’l, 158 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). 
 181 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 182 See In re W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 597; In re Staggie, 255 B.R. 48, 52 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000). 
 183 See In re CWS Enter., 870 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017); In re K.H. Stephenson Supply Co., 768 
F.2d 580, 585 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc., 794 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1986); In re 268 
Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 676–77 (9th Cir. 1986).  
 184 See, e.g., In re CWS Enter., 870 F.3d at 1115.  
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this reasonableness standard. In a case where there is a fee-shifting statute or 
contract that provides for reasonable fees, the court has the ability to adjust an 
award provided under a contingency fee arrangement so long as the court deems 
that attorney’s fee award unreasonable.185 Courts generally follow the “lodestar 
method” when determining the reasonability of attorneys’ fees.186 Under this 
method, courts calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee rate by “multiplying the 
attorneys’ reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably 
expended.”187 While the lodestar method is the primary method for calculating 
attorneys’ fees, use of this method is not mandatory in bankruptcy 
proceedings.188 Courts therefore have the flexibility to employ any federal 
formula they see fit.189 For example, bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit190 
determined the reasonability of attorneys’ fees by comparing (1) a claim for 
attorneys’ fees with (2) the total amount likely to be recovered in that case.191 
This comparative standard places a duty on the attorney to “scale his or her fees 
at least to the reasonably expected recovery,”192 and to stop working on his or 
her case when the “time spent by counsel is not helpful because it is grossly 
disproportionate to the amount at stake.”193 Otherwise, an attorney may not be 
awarded all of the fees he requests from the court.194  
 
 185 See, e.g., Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 371 F.3d 120, 131 (Wyo. 2016) (reducing attorneys’ fee 
award to $311,478.13 from initial contingency agreement where attorney was entitled to 40% of gross recovery 
after trial ($422,393.04 in fees on a $1,055,982.62 judgment)). 
 186 See generally In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the lodestar method is 
the “formula used to calculate fees under various federal fee-shifting statutes”). 
 187 Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 879 (11th Cir. 1990); see C.R. Bowles, 
What is Reasonable Under Lodestar, AM. BANKR. INST. (Dec. 1, 2004), https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/what-
is-reasonable-under-lodestar.  
 188 See In re K.H. Stephenson Supply Co., 924 F.2d at 960. 
 189 See First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bassett, 83 P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1938) (seeking compensation on a 
quantum meruit basis); In re K.H. Stephenson Supply Co., 924 F.2d at 960. 
 190 This Ninth Circuit rule presumably defines reasonability standards when applying California’s inverse 
condemnation statute, but as discussed in supra Section III.B.1, the laws at the state level do not control the 
bankruptcy courts.  
 191 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924 F.2d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 
1991) (using alternative fee formula, where reasonable compensation was one-third of the total recovery); In re 
Segovia, 387 B.R. 773, 782 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that $50,000 was the maximum amount that could 
be allowed as reasonable, where the likely maximum recovery was $150,000); In re DBI Housing, LLC, 2012 
Bankr. LEXIS 2984, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 29, 2012) (disallowing portion of attorneys’ fees because the 
debtor’s attorney did not scale its services to the expected recovery). 
 192 In re Segovia, 387 B.R. at 779. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See, e.g., Puget Sound Plywood, 924 F.2d at 956 (affirming district court’s award of attorneys’ fees; 
awarding $7,172.63 of the $21,465.00 requested by attorney in his fee application). 
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When an attorney’s fees are paid on a contingency basis, courts sometimes 
consider making a contingency adjustment to the lodestar calculation.195 This 
adjustment provides an additional amount of fees to attorneys working under 
contingency agreements, on top of the usual lodestar fee amounts. Underlying 
this adjustment is the theory that an attorney is unlikely to take a high-risk 
contingency case without the assurance that she will receive a premium on fees 
if the litigation is successful.196 Moreover, the party seeking a contingency 
adjustment bears the burden of justifying the imposition of the additional fee.197 
However, the Supreme Court recognized a “strong presumption” that the 
lodestar calculation is reasonable on its own, which may only be overcome under 
“rare circumstances.”198  
b. Structure of a Code Amendment 
There are two possible ways to achieve this amendment to the Code: (1) by 
amending section 502(b)(4) to disallow unreasonable claims of attorneys for 
both debtors and creditors, or (2) by amending section 726 to separate payments 
on the reasonable and unreasonable portions of claims for all attorney fees. Of 
these two proposed amendments, this Comment advocates for latter, as its 
approach allows unreasonable claims for attorneys’ fees to be filed—respecting 
the parties’ freedom to contract, even if the tort victim made a bad deal with his 
attorney—while still affording bankruptcy courts the means to protect an estate 
from these unreasonable claims if the estate is short on funds.  
i. Amending 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(4) 
Under the first proposed amendment to the Code, Congress would re-write 
section 502(b)(4) to empower bankruptcy courts to disallow all unreasonable 
claims for services of an attorney—including both attorneys for the debtor and 
the creditor. For bankruptcy courts, this amendment would be an efficient 
change because it would not require judges to apply a new standard. Instead, 
they would apply the current standard used to evaluate the reasonability of a 
debtor’s attorneys’ fees claim. 
 
 195 See Morgan v. Kingen, 210 P.3d 995, 1000 (2009). But see City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 
567 (1992) (finding against adoption of contingency enhancement for lodestar). 
 196 See Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193, 204 (1983); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. 
Sorenson, 371 P.3d 120, 135 (Wyo. 2016) (“a reasonable fee is one that is adequate to induce competent counsel 
to undertake representation in a meritorious case, but it should not result in a windfall.”). 
 197 Morgan, 210 P.3d at 1000. 
 198 Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 543 (2010); see Pennaco Energy, Inc., 371 P.3d at 133–35 
(describing factors to consider when applying a multiplier). 
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If adopted, the first amendment would simplify the claim allowance process 
for all claims for attorneys’ fees—whether made by the debtor or a creditor. 
Beginning with section 502(a), the court would assume that all claims for the 
services of a creditor or debtor’s attorney are permissible. Next, the court would 
review each of the disallowance provisions of section 502(b). When reviewing 
the section 502(b)(1) exception, most claims for creditors’ attorneys’ fees would 
presumptively be disallowed because they are “unenforceable against the debtor 
. . . under any agreement or applicable law.”199 Recall, the American Rule 
requires individuals to pay their own attorneys’ fees.200 However, if an 
enforceable fee-shifting contract or statute existed, then these claims for 
attorneys’ fees would be enforceable under applicable law, and therefore no 
longer disallowed under section 502(b)(1).  
Subsequently, we would now need to look at the proposed amendment to 
section 502(b)(4). In this amended version of section 502(b)(4), all debtor and 
creditor claims for attorneys’ fees would be disallowed to the extent that they 
were unreasonable. The reasonable amounts would remain allowed under 
section 502(a) because these amounts were not disallowed by any provisions in 
section 502(b). When handling the allowed reasonable fees under section 506, 
this amended version of the Code would conform with the current majority 
approach to a creditor’s attorneys’ fees. The result would be as follows: over-
secured creditors’ claims for attorneys’ fees would receive elevated secured 
status; all other allowed unsecured claims would remain unaffected by section 
506(b), and their attorneys’ fees would remain unsecured.  
This amendment diverges from the current Code because claims for 
unreasonable creditors’ attorneys’ fees are never disallowed. While a creditor’s 
over-secured claim and the accompanying reasonable attorneys’ fees receive 
elevated secured status, the Code does not address unreasonable fees. While 
these unreasonable fees did not receive elevated status under section 506, the 
Code does not disallow such fees because section 502(b) does not prohibit the 
unreasonable creditor’s claims for attorneys’ fees.201 Under the current Code, 
the over-secured creditor’s claim for unreasonable fees still exists in its non-
elevated form, and has the same status as all other unsecured claims. As the Code 
is currently interpreted by the majority of courts, over-secured creditors receive 
their unreasonable fees at the same pro rata amount as unsecured creditors 
 
 199 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 449 (2007) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) 
(2019)).  
 200 See id. at 448; In re Lane Poultry of Carolina, Inc., 63 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986). 
 201 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(4) (2019) (only applies to attorneys of the debtor). 
FIRESTONE_12.16.20 12/16/2020 2:18 PM 
2020] REASONABILITY OF A CREDITOR’S CLAIM 203 
receive even their reasonable fees.202 Therefore, this amendment to section 
502(b)(4) would resolve this problem by ensuring that attorneys are never able 
to collect on their unreasonable claims.  
ii. Amending 11 U.S.C. § 726 
A second way to amend the Code would involve leaving section 502(b)(4) 
unchanged. Because section 502(b)(4) only disallows a portion of a debtor’s 
attorneys’ claim, the reasonable and unreasonable amounts of a creditor’s 
attorneys’ fees would both remain allowed.203 After a creditor’s attorney made 
a claim for fees in section 502(a), there would still be no provision in section 
502(b) that disallowed any portion of those fees. In accordance with the majority 
view, these fees—in their reasonable and unreasonable amounts—would remain 
allowed. Reasonable over-secured claims for attorneys’ fees would then be 
elevated in section 506(b), leaving the same analysis as found in Section 
II.A.2.b.i. of this Comment.204  
The Code would then be amended with respect to section 726, creating a 
new category for sequential distribution to unsecured creditors. In section 726, 
all unsecured creditors receive their distributions at a certain level of priority 
among claims. This second proposed Code amendment would provide a 
subsequent category for distribution, known as “unreasonable claims for 
attorneys’ fees,” which would include both over-secured and unsecured 
creditor’s remaining attorneys’ fees. With this amendment, over-secured 
creditors would receive their reasonable attorneys’ fees first205 and unsecured 
creditors would receive their reasonable attorneys’ fees second.206 The new 
amendment would allow all remaining unreasonable claims for attorneys’ fees 
to be distributed only if the estate still had resources after all other distributions. 
Because the commentary on the topic of attorneys’ fees often emphasizes the 
importance of leaving attorneys with the benefit of their bargained-for contract, 
 
 202 See In re 268, Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986). The Western District of Kentucky applied the 
In re 268, Ltd. standard, finding:  
Although the balance of the fees sought by the creditor in 268 Limited, were not reasonable and 
thus were not entitled to a secured status under Section 506(b), . . . they were enforceable under 
state law and, therefore, could be claimed under Section 502(b)(1) just as any other unsecured 
claim. 
Liberty Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. George, 70 B.R. 312, 317 (W.D. Ky. 1987). 
 203 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(4). 
 204 Supra Section II.A.2.b.i. 
 205 See 11 U.S.C. § 725.  
 206 See id. § 726. 
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this amendment to the Code balances the freedom to contract with the need to 
preserve finite resources of the bankruptcy estate.207 Thus, while the current 
Code makes pro rata distributions to unsecured creditors on their allowed claims 
all at once, this amendment would ensure that all reasonable attorneys’ claims, 
as well as unsecured tort victim claims, were fulfilled in whole before any money 
went towards an unreasonable claim for attorneys’ fees.  
c. Comparing Policy Implications of the Suggested Amendments 
When comparing these two approaches to amending the Code, both have 
important policy implications. Under the first approach—which disallowed all 
unreasonable fees—the bankruptcy court would be tampering with the parties’ 
freedom to contract. With this approach, there is no way a creditor or debtor’s 
attorney would ever receive the unreasonable portion of their contracted-for 
fees. Under the second approach, the attorneys could receive the unreasonable 
portion of their fees, but this would only happen if there was money left in the 
estate after all pro rata distributions to unsecured creditors. The second approach 
still interferes with the parties’ freedom to contract, but it now balances this right 
with the bankruptcy court’s desire to distribute assets of the estate in the most 
equitable manner, since an unreasonable claim would be demoted under the 
second approach. In sum, Congress must acknowledge certain important policy 
considerations before deciding whether to take either approach to amending the 
Code. The following section shall discuss policy considerations for the adoption 
of either proposed amendment. 
3. Policy Arguments for a Code Amendment  
a. Bankruptcy Courts Are Courts of Equity 
The bankruptcy process has two primary goals to balance: (1) providing the 
debtor with a fresh start from his pre-bankruptcy debts and (2) providing 
equitable treatment for all creditors. According to the Supreme Court, a 
bankruptcy court has the complete power to evaluate the validity of claims 
asserted against the estate “according to the equities of the case.”208 The 
bankruptcy court can therefore modify the relationship between creditors and 
 
 207 See Michael L. Cook, Court Wrongly Disallows Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fees, LAW360 (Dec. 
8, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/154014/Law360-Court-Wrongly-Disallows-
Lender-s-Post-Bankruptcy-Legal-Fe.pdf; In re United Merch. & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1982).  
 208 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939). 
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debtors in the name of equity209 and should be given the explicit power to review 
a creditor’s claim for their attorneys’ fees to ensure this claim is reasonable.  
b. Parties Should Have the Freedom to Contract 
On the other hand, parties should be free to govern their own contractual 
arrangements without the inference of the government.210 When parties agree to 
pay a certain amount of attorneys’ fees, the attorney collecting those fees might 
have declined to provide his services for fees of any lesser amount.211 
Furthermore, if a creditor’s attorney knows that bankruptcy courts might alter 
his contractual rights to attorneys’ fees, then the attorney might refuse to take on 
the creditor’s bankruptcy case.212 This refusal would hurt creditors because they 
would struggle to find representation in bankruptcy proceedings.  
While there are competing concerns between the bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers and the parties’ freedom to contract, exceptions for creditors’ 
attorneys should not be made in the name of enforcing contracts. Under the 
current Code, attorneys often agree to represent debtors, even with the 
understanding that their fee arrangements might be altered by bankruptcy courts. 
As a result, debtors’ attorneys are not discouraged from entering these fee 
contracts when representing debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors’ 
attorneys also should not be discouraged, as they are motivated by the same 
incentive—to get paid—as the debtor’s attorneys. Like debtors’ attorneys, 
whose fees are subject to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, creditors’ 
attorneys should not receive windfall awards for their unreasonable fees in 
bankruptcy proceedings. Additionally, the Code already grants bankruptcy 
judges the equitable power to alter contracted payment amounts for all other 
attorneys in bankruptcy.213 Thus, Congress’ adoption of one of these Code 
amendments would effectuate a more consistent standard of treatment for 
attorneys across bankruptcy proceedings, rather than leaving ambiguity 
regarding the power of judges to adjust fee contracts in cases involving creditors’ 
attorneys’ fees.  
 
 209 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 210 Hamdan, supra note 121, at 2310.  
 211 See Hamdan, supra note 121, at 2286. 
 212 See In re United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 137–44 (2d Cir. 1982) (“allowing a claim under 
a collection costs provision merely effectuates the bargained-for terms of the loan contract . . . . [as the 
appellants] merely seek to reap the benefits of a fairly negotiated bargain.”). 
 213 See In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). 
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c. The Unexpected Fact Pattern from PG&E Leads to Unjust Results 
Without This Code Amendment 
If Congress predicted a situation like PG&E where many creditors receive 
their attorneys’ fees from one debtor, Congress would have wanted to avoid this 
type of result. This result is unjust for three inter-connected reasons. First, an 
attorney typically enters into a contingency fee arrangement when facing a high 
risk of nonrecovery that justifies her collection of a higher rate of compensation 
than she might receive in a case where the risk of nonrecovery is relatively low. 
Because the PG&E matter is proceeding in the bankruptcy court,214 the attorneys 
involved are not taking on the risk of losing the case in trial and receiving 
nothing. Moreover, because every client in the PG&E case will receive a 
payment from PG&E’s estate, this payment guarantee also extends to their 
attorneys. Therefore, while a higher percentage fee may seem reasonable in the 
context of a risky jury trial, a bankruptcy judge might suspect that lawyers 
entering into high recovery arrangements with unsophisticated tort claimants are 
simply taking advantage of the bankruptcy system.  
Second, even if an attorney in the PG&E case created an attorney-client 
relationship with the tort victim before she knew that the PG&E case would be 
proceeding in the bankruptcy court system, a high contingency fee arrangement 
would still be inappropriate. More specifically, because the inverse 
condemnation statute created strict liability for PG&E, the risk of non-recovery 
in the PG&E case was less than that of usual mass tort cases where attorneys 
must use contingency fee arrangements to mitigate the risk of nonrecovery. If 
the PG&E case had proceeded in trial court, and then the attorney and client 
came to the bankruptcy court to collect on their judgment,215 the bankruptcy 
judge still would have wanted a mechanism to reduce the unreasonable 
contingency fees of attorneys.216  
Third, while unreasonable contingency fee arrangements are always harmful 
when an attorney takes advantage of a client, the impact of the unreasonable fee 
arrangement in the PG&E bankruptcy case extends beyond this effect. If there 
was not a fee-shifting statute in this case, all tort victims would receive their pro 
rata distribution, and then would pay their attorneys outside of bankruptcy based 
on their private contractual agreements. In the PG&E case, because the 
bankruptcy court treats attorneys’ fees like any other unsecured claim, the 
 
 214 Avalos, supra note 16. 
 215 This could also happen if Judge Montali lifted the automatic stay via 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2019). 
 216 See generally In re 268, Ltd., 85 B.R. 101, 103 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (“The Supreme Court in Nevada 
considered unreasonable attorney fee contracts to be at war with the best interests of society.”). 
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creditors with high contingency fees are taking advantage of the entire estate. 
Thus, while a debtor’s attorney who applied for unreasonable fees would have 
his claim partially disallowed under section 502(b)(4), a creditor’s attorney 
could gain a windfall recovery of unreasonable fees from the debtor that reduces 
the pro rata share for all other claimants in their class. Reflecting on the 
contingency rates in the PG&E case, one expert stated that, “[s]ome attorneys 
are charging 33 percent, even 40 percent. Personally, I don’t see any justification 
for a contingency fee higher than 20 to 25 percent in this matter.”217 With one 
of these amendments to the Code, the bankruptcy court would not need to use 
valuable assets of the estate to pay such unreasonable claims by creditors’ 
attorneys. These proposed amendments would leave more distributions for 
unsecured creditors, such as the tort victims, who actually incurred harm from 
the debtor.218 
4. Potential Arguments Against Amending the Code  
There are two potential arguments against amending the Code to disallow 
unreasonable claims by creditors for their attorneys’ fees. First, courts will rarely 
invoke this amendment because cases involving fee-shifting statutes, like 
PG&E, are uncommon in the context of bankruptcy proceedings.219 However, 
this argument is not compelling because Congress should not leave gaps in a 
statute simply because an issue does not arise often. Second, this amendment 
may actually hurt the tort victim creditors, who could potentially be liable to 
their attorneys for any unpaid fees in bankruptcy proceedings. But this argument 
fails because tort victims would not be liable for the unreasonable portion of 
their attorneys’ fees outside of bankruptcy.220  
a. These Code Amendments Would Not Affect Most Bankruptcy Cases, 
But Would Have a Meaningful Impact on Future Cases with Fee-
Shifting Statute Like PG&E 
While Congress should amend the Code to disallow unreasonable claims for 
a creditor’s attorneys’ fees, in most bankruptcy cases this change is unlikely to 
significantly increase unsecured creditors’ distributions on their claims. First, 
 
 217 Helen Sedwick, FAQs about PG&E Bankruptcy, KENWOOD PRESS (May 15, 2019) https://www. 
kenwoodpress.com/pub/a/10609?full=1. 
 218 See In re 268, Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.  
 219 See Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 220 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2019) (explaining that the discharge of the debtor’s debts does not 
extinguish the debts owed by the debtor; it merely protects the debtor from personal liability on these discharged 
debts. The debt can still be enforced against third party obligors). 
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unsecured creditors generally pay their own attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases 
because of the American Rule.221 Because a tort victim will rarely have a pre-
bankruptcy contract with the debtor, these unsecured creditors can only submit 
a claim for their attorneys’ fees in the rare situation where a fee-shifting statute 
applies.222 Second, in bankruptcy proceedings, unsecured creditors are not paid 
in accordance with what they are owed, but instead receive distributions based 
on much the debtor can afford to pay them.223 Unsecured creditors “rarely 
receive more than pennies on the dollar on account of their unsecured claims.”224 
While this amendment “may result in some reallocation of the limited funds 
available to pay unsecured claims [because certain attorneys would receive a 
smaller portion of funds], . . . in most cases, it is unlikely to significantly increase 
the amount that unsecured creditors are paid on account of their claims.”225 The 
unreasonable portion of attorneys’ fees would now be available for distribution 
to the other unsecured members of the class. But, because there are so many 
unsecured claimants seeking distributions from the bankruptcy court, the 
increase in the pro rata payout that each individual claimant receives may not be 
very large. Because these pro rata amounts for individual claimants generally 
will not increase dramatically, one could argue that it is not worth the hassle to 
amend the Code. However, this argument does not stand true for the PG&E case 
because experts predict that the wildfire victims will recover on a high 
percentage of the claims that they submitted.226 In addition, when PG&E last 
filed for bankruptcy, the estate paid all claims in full.227 Therefore, this 
amendment could have a meaningful effect on these victims’ recovery in rare 
situations like this PG&E bankruptcy case.228  
b. Tort Victim Creditors Might Appear To Be on the Hook for Unpaid 
Attorneys’ Fees Outside of Bankruptcy, But That is Incorrect 
If the debtor is not required to pay the full amount of a creditor’s contractual 
attorneys’ fees, the creditor might remain obligated to pay these fees. While a 
debtor receives a discharge for personal liability on any unpaid debts after 
exiting bankruptcy, her third-party co-debtors retain personal liability for these 
 
 221 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007).  
 222 See Berman & Gilhuly, supra note 78, at 32. 
 223 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2019); William Hallam, Fourth Circuit Allows Unsecured Creditors to Assert 
Claims for Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, JD SUPRA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/fourth-circuit-allows-unsecured-79216/.  
 224 Hallam, supra note 223.  
 225 Hallam, supra note 223.  
 226 See Sedwick, supra note 217. 
 227 Sedwick, supra note 217. 
 228 See Sedwick, supra note 217. 
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debts because these third parties did not receive the debtor’s discharge in 
bankruptcy.229 This logic extends to the creditor’s situation. Specifically, while 
the debtor must pay the reasonable attorneys’ fees for a creditor’s claim, the 
creditor would remain contractually bound for any unreasonable fees under their 
agreement with the attorney. Creditors who can shift their reasonable attorneys’ 
fees through section 506(b) still bear any costs of “over-lawyering” if they “[fail] 
to exercise restraint in the attorneys’ fees and expenses they incur” in the 
litigation.230 If a court finds that a creditor’s attorneys’ fees seem excessive, the 
unreasonable portion of these fees would generally be borne by the creditor 
instead of the debtor.231  
Fortunately, because the attorneys of tort victims generally use contingency 
fee agreements to collect payment for their legal services, the tort victims in 
PG&E will not remain liable for these fees. This conclusion is apparent for two 
reasons. First, attorneys bear the risk of non-payment for their services when 
working under a contingency agreement.232 Forcing a creditor to assume liability 
for any unreasonable attorneys’ fees would be at odds with this allocation of 
risk.233 Second, the attorney acts as a fiduciary for the creditor, which requires 
that attorney to act “primarily, if not exclusively for their client’s 
interests. . . .”234 When a bankruptcy judge finds that an attorney’s contingency 
fee was unreasonable, it deems that the attorney breached his fiduciary duty by 
asking his client for an award that is disproportionate to that client’s potential 
recovery.235 Fiduciary law commands that this contingency fee contract is 
therefore unenforceable, because its terms were unfair to the client.236 The laws 
of equity and fairness supersede contract law in this situation. Therefore, under 
either of the proposed Code amendments, the creditor would not be required to 
pay any remaining, unreasonable portion of his claim for attorneys’ fees that 
were not covered by the debtor.  
 
 229 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2019) (noting that discharge “operates as an injunction against the 
commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset 
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of debt is waived”) (emphasis added).  
 230 In re Staggie, 255 B.R. 48, 54 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000). 
 231 See In re Ward, 190 B.R. 242, 251 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (“Although these charges are not necessarily 
wrong or improper, such expense is more properly directed toward the creditor instead of the debtor.”). 
 232 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561 (1992). 
 233 See Genet, supra note 13 (responding to the Ninth Circuit upholding of a decision to limit an attorney’s 
fees to their reasonable value by warning readers about the “material financial hazard for . . . [a]ttorneys who 
routinely handle contingency fee matters”). 
 234 Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 29, 46–47 (1989). 
 235 See id. at 51. 
 236 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy judges should have the ability to cap the fees of all attorneys in 
bankruptcy, including creditors’ claims for their attorneys’ fees. Congress 
should therefore amend the Code to provide that judges have the power to alter 
these creditors’ claims for attorneys’ fees. This amendment could be 
accomplished in one of two ways. First, Congress could amend section 
502(b)(4). While section 502(b)(4) currently provides that claims for services of 
a debtor’s attorney will be disallowed to the extent they are unreasonable, this 
amendment would provide that claims for services of an attorney of the debtor 
or creditor must be reasonable. Second, Congress could amend section 726, 
creating a new category for pro rata distribution for unreasonable claims. With 
this second amendment, creditors with unreasonable claims could not collect on 
these claims until all other unsecured claims are paid. This second amendment 
would allow the bankruptcy court to remain a court of equity, while still 
accommodating for parties’ freedom to contract. 
Both of these amendments would provide a substantive change to the Code 
by giving judges the explicit power to restrict all attorneys’ claims for fees to 
their reasonable value. These amendments would also clarify the jurisdictional 
split that currently exists when interpreting the Code. Only a minority of courts 
argue that section 506 disallows all unsecured creditors’ claims for their 
attorneys’ fees, and this view is inconsistent with all other Code provisions. The 
issue is still live, however, in federal courts and therefore should be clarified by 
Congress. With these proposed amendments, there would be explicit language 
in the Code discussing creditor’s claims for attorneys’ fees. These amendments 
to the Code would clarify the current jurisdictional split by reaffirming, in line 
with the majority view, that the Code has never disallowed a creditor’s claims 
for attorneys’ fees. 
While the issue of the debtor’s payment of unsecured creditors’ attorneys’ 
fees rarely comes up in bankruptcy, it can have a significant impact on the 
recovery of all unsecured creditors in cases like PG&E. Unsecured creditors will 
often only recover the bare minimum of what they are owed in bankruptcy. 
Therefore, from a policy perspective, it is important to maximize the unsecured 
creditors’ recovery by minimizing wasteful payouts. By definition, an 
“unreasonable” payment to any claimant is a wasteful payout. Congress has 
already provided judges with the power to restrict unreasonable claims by every 
attorney in bankruptcy, other than creditors’ attorneys. These creditors’ 
attorneys should be no different than other attorneys and should be limited to 
collecting on the reasonable value of a claim for their fees. If the PG&E lawsuit 
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proceeded in a trial court, the inverse condemnation statute would have limited 
these claims for attorneys’ fees to their reasonable value. These creditors’ 
attorneys should not be able to receive additional unreasonable recovery simply 
because the bankruptcy judges do not have the analogous power to limit these 
fee claims. Unsecured creditors in bankruptcy are already limited in what they 
can collect, since there are limited funds available for distribution in the debtor’s 
estate, and unsecured creditors are one of the last creditors to be paid in 
bankruptcy. Therefore, to prevent creditors’ attorneys from collecting a windfall 
recovery at the expense of all other unsecured creditors, Congress should amend 
the Code to provide judges with the power to disallow all unreasonable claims 
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